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CASE SUMMARY
SOTO-SOTO V. GARLAND: NINTH CIRCUIT
RULES BIA APPLIED THE WRONG
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ERRED IN
DENYING A VICTIM OF TORTURE
DEFERRAL OF REMOVAL UNDER THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
VANESSA LEE*

INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision to deny a deferral of removal
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 The BIA held that the
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) findings that granted Delfina Soto-Soto relief
under CAT were clearly erroneous.2 The BIA reasoned that the IJ failed
to acknowledge certain facts that indicate Soto-Soto is not likely to suffer
torture if removed back to her country of origin, Mexico.3 On appeal,
Soto-Soto argues that the BIA did not apply the correct standard of review.4 Instead of reviewing the IJ’s finding under the clear error standard, Soto-Soto contends that the BIA improperly engaged in de novo
review.5
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Golden Gate University School of Law; B.A. Political Economy and
Latin American Literature, University of California, Berkeley; Associate Editor, Golden Gate
University Law Review.
1
Soto-Soto v. Garland, 1 F.4th 655, 657 (9th Cir. 2021).
2
Id. at 658.
3
Id. at 658, 663.
4
Id. at 659.
5
Id. at 659.
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The parties agree that the proper standard of review for the BIA is
clear error.6 The Ninth Circuit determined that the BIA applied the
wrong standard of review and held that Soto-Soto qualifies for relief
under the clear error standard.7
I. BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 20, 2012, Soto-Soto was arrested by the state police at her
home in Uruapan, a city located in the state of Michoacán, Mexico.8
Soto-Soto, a forty-two-year-old indigenous Mexican woman, was arrested for allegedly kidnapping and murdering five-year-old Bernardino
Bravo Gomez (“Bernardino”).9 The Michoacán state police, specifically,
from the Office of Anti-Kidnapping and Extortions, drove Soto-Soto approximately two hours away from her home to a town called Morelia in
Michoacán, where she was brutally tortured.10 Soto-Soto testified that
she initially denied any involvement with the kidnapping of Bernardino
and sustained hours of being pulled by the hair, thrown to the ground,
repeatedly kicked with her hands tied behind her back, punched in the
stomach, suffocated, and called a “fucking bitch.”11
As Soto-Soto continued to deny involvement with the kidnapping,
the torture escalated.12 The repeated sequence of slapping Soto-Soto’s
face, throwing her to the ground, and suffocating her with a plastic bag
intensified as police officers hit Soto-Soto’s head against the wall and
pointed a gun at her head several times, stating the officers would “keep
[her] right there like a bitch” if she did not sign a confession.13 Despite
being held at gunpoint, Soto-Soto did not accede until the police officers
threatened to rape and kill her daughters if she did not sign the confession in the next fifteen minutes.14 Soto-Soto signed the confession and
was warned she would be tortured again if she were to report the officers
to anyone.15 During the next eight months, Soto-Soto was detained in
Uruapan but was not tortured.16
6

Id. at 659.
Id. at 659-63.
8
Id. at 657.
9
Id. at 657.
10
Id. at 657-58; Id. at 662.
11
Id. at 657.
12
Id. at 657.
13
Id. at 657.
14
Id. at 657.
15
Id. at 657.
16
Id. at 657-58.
7
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On December 10, 2012, Soto-Soto was released from custody as the
Mexican trial court dismissed the charges for lack of evidence and she
immediately fled to the United States.17 On December 19, 2012, the Michoacán State Human Rights Commission filed a complaint regarding
Soto-Soto’s torture, however, the complaint was dismissed because SotoSoto failed to provide a contact address.18 In 2013, the Mexican government refiled the charges against Soto-Soto and obtained a warrant for
Soto-Soto’s arrest.19 On November 12, 2015, INTERPOL issued a Red
Notice for Soto-Soto’s extradition to Michoacán, Mexico.20 On November 28, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security took Soto-Soto into
custody and placed her in removal proceedings.21
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During the removal hearings, the IJ found Soto-Soto’s claim to be
credible and tendered Soto-Soto’s testimony full evidentiary weight.22
Soto-Soto’s arrest warrant from the renewed investigation in 2013 supported “serious reasons to believe” that Soto-Soto committed a “serious
nonpolitical crime” before she arrived to the United States.23 Therefore,
IJ held Soto-Soto was “statutorily ineligible for asylum, withholding of
removal under the [Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)], and withholding of removal under [CAT].”24 However, IJ also determined that
the “alleged serious nonpolitical crime” did not bar Soto-Soto from obtaining a deferral of removal under CAT and considered Soto-Soto’s eligibility for that relief.25
The IJ granted Soto-Soto deferral of removal under CAT because
Soto-Soto met her burden by showing “it was more likely than not that
she would be tortured with government involvement or acquiescence if
removed to Mexico.”26 The IJ determined that the following facts
demonstrated Soto-Soto’s likelihood of future torture: (1) Soto-Soto had
been tortured by the Michoacán state police from the Office of AntiKidnapping and Extorsions; (2) Mexican authorities are “more likely
than not” to stop and take Soto-Soto back into custody upon her return
because the Mexican authorities reinitiated the prosecution against Soto17

Id.
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
18
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Soto and had an arrest warrant; (3) indigenous women like Soto-Soto are
particularly vulnerable to torture as evidenced in the country conditions
report on Mexico; and (4) Soto-Soto reported her torture to the Michoacán State Commission of Human Rights after she was specifically
threatened to be tortured again if she were to report the torture to
anyone.27
The Government appealed the IJ’s grant of deferral of removal
under CAT to the Board of Immigration Review (BIA).28 The BIA reversed the IJ’s grant and held the IJ’s finding that Soto-Soto was “more
likely than not” to be tortured upon returning to Mexico was clearly erroneous.29 The BIA stated that the IJ failed to acknowledge certain facts in
determining Soto-Soto’s eligibility and provided three reasons for reversing the IJ’s decision.30 First, the IJ did not acknowledge the fact that the
Mexican judicial system had taken steps to correct Soto-Soto’s past due
process errors.31 Although there was a new investigation, “the Mexican
judicial system excluded the evidence obtained through torture and conducted a new investigation that independently resulted in the current
charges against [Soto-Soto].”32 Second, the IJ did not acknowledge that
Soto-Soto was not harmed by the officers during the eight months she
was held in custody.33 Third, Soto-Soto’s family in Mexico remained
unharmed.34
Soto-Soto appealed the BIA’s reversal of IJ’s grant of deferral of
removal under CAT.35
II. ANALYSIS
Soto-Soto appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on
grounds that the BIA improperly reviewed the IJ’s finding.36 The BIA
erroneously reviewed the IJ’s finding under de novo review, instead clear
error, which is the correct standard.37 The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the
BIA’s reasoning for reversing the IJ’s decision to determine whether the
BIA applied the appropriate standard of review.38 The Ninth Circuit then
27

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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determined whether the IJ’s findings were clearly erroneous under the
proper standard of review.39
A. THE BIA IMPROPERLY ENGAGED IN DE NOVO REVIEW
When the issue of the BIA’s standard of review is raised, the court
determines “whether the BIA faithfully employed the clear error standard
or engaged in improper de novo review of the IJ’s factual findings.”40
The BIA commits an error of law if the BIA does not limit its review to
clear error and instead engages in de novo review.41 The BIA “faithfully
employ[s] the clear error standard” if the BIA reverses an IJ’s factual
finding because it is “illogical or implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.”42 A strong indication that the BIA did not “faithfully employ the clear error standard” is
when the “BIA does not address the ‘key factual findings’ that the IJ
based its conclusion.”43 Another justifiable inference that the BIA applied a de novo review is when the BIA reaches a different conclusion
from the IJ because the BIA gave more weight to some facts over
others.44
In Soto-Soto’s case, the Ninth Circuit found that the BIA had a different view of the evidence than the IJ did.45 However, the three reasons
the BIA provided for reversing the IJ (the Mexican judicial system had
taken steps to correct past due process errors, Soto-Soto was unharmed
for eight months, and Soto-Soto’s family in Mexico remained unharmed)
failed to explain how the IJ’s finding of Soto-Soto’s future persecution
lacked logic, plausibility, or support in the record.46 The IJ held that
Soto-Soto was “more likely than not” to suffer torture because: (1) SotoSoto had already been tortured by the officers before; (2) Soto-Soto is
more likely to be arrested than not upon returning to Mexico; (3) SotoSoto is an indigenous woman who is more likely to be tortured per country condition reports on Mexico; and (4) Soto-Soto reported her torture,
39

Id. at 659-63.
Id. at 659 (citing Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012)).
41
Id. at 659.
42
Id. at 659 (citing Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012)).
43
Id. at 659 (citing Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012)).
44
Id. at 659; See also Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that the BIA
reviewed the IJ’s decision de novo because “the clear error standard does not allow the BIA to
reweigh the evidence when the IJ’s account of the evidence is plausible”) (citing Rodriguez, 683
F.3d at 1171); see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 857-58 (1982) (stating
“an appellate court cannot substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that of the trial court
simply because the reviewing court might give the facts another construction [or] resolve the ambiguities differently[.]”).
45
Id. at 660.
46
Id. at 660.
40
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increasing her likelihood of being tortured again.47 Instead of showing
how the IJ erred in its factual determination, the BIA’s reasoning demonstrated a “de novo weighing of the evidence.”48
The Ninth Circuit next held that no facts support the BIA’s view of
the evidence.49 In response to the first reason the BIA provided for reversing the IJ’s finding that Soto-Soto was “more likely than not” to be
tortured upon removal, the court stated that the record did not show that
Soto-Soto’s charges were dismissed because the Mexican judicial system
took steps to cure past due process errors.50 Rather, the record showed
that the reason the Mexican court dismissed Soto-Soto’s charges was because they lacked evidence to charge Soto-Soto.51 The Mexican court
found that the evidence against Soto-Soto was insufficient because SotoSoto’s confession lacked probative value for two reasons: (1) police not
only failed to obtain judicial authorization to carry out questionings at
several domiciles but also had contradictions regarding Soto-Soto’s confession; and (2) Soto-Soto speaks the indigenous language Purepecha,
however, she was not provided with a Purepecha interpreter during questioning.52 Moreover, the Mexican court that dismissed Soto-Soto’s
charges did not acknowledge the fact that Soto-Soto was tortured by the
police officers and failed to impose safeguards to ensure that Soto-Soto
would not be further tortured for another improper confession.53
The Ninth Circuit further held that the BIA would not be able to
reverse the IJ under the clear error standard of review even if the record
supported the BIA’s view of the evidence.54 The court stated that the IJ
“is entitled to broad deference from the BIA” when determining whether
the facts in the record would affect the likelihood of future torture.55 For
example, the IJ reasoned that the Mexican authorities would detain SotoSoto again because of the second arrest warrant, which increases SotoSoto’s likelihood of torture.56 However, the BIA’s review gave no deference to the IJ’s fact finding.57 The Ninth Circuit also stated that the
BIA’s second and third reasons for reversing the IJ were also not supported by the record and irrelevant.58 The BIA’s second reason that Soto47

Id. at 658-60.
Id. at 660.
49
Id. at 660.
50
Id. at 660.
51
Id. at 657-60.
52
Id. at 660.
53
Id. at 660.
54
Id. at 661 (citing Inwood Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. at 857-58).
55
Id. at 661.
56
Id. at 661.
57
Id. at 661.
58
Id. at 661.
48
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Soto was not harmed by the officers for eight months does not demonstrate whether the police officers intend to carry out their threat in the
future because no fact suggests state police officers knew Soto-Soto had
filed a complaint with the human rights commission after being released
from custody.59 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that the BIA’s third
argument regarding the safety of Soto-Soto’s family members in Mexico
was irrelevant because the threat “hinged on whether Soto-Soto returns
to Mexico.”60
Finally, the Ninth Circuit stated that BIA engaged in “re-weighing
evidence” when it failed to discuss other “key factual findings” of the IJ
like the country condition reports regarding indigenous women in Mexico.61 The BIA did not engage in clear error review when it concluded
that the Mexican government’s effort to eliminate torture outweighed the
country conditions report, which conversely, the IJ found to increase
Soto-Soto’s likelihood of future torture.62 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
held that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review by giving no
deference to IJ’s view of the evidence and substituting its own.63
B. IJ FINDINGS WERE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS UNDER THE PROPER
STANDARD OF REVIEW: CLEAR ERROR
When determining whether an applicant is “more likely than not” to
be tortured upon removal, the following factors must be considered:
(1) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant; (2) Evidence
that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal
where he or she is not likely to be tortured; (3) Evidence of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal, where applicable; and (4) Other relevant information regarding
conditions in the country of removal.64

Of the factors above,
[p]ast torture is ordinarily the principal factor on which we rely when
an applicant who has been previously tortured seeks relief under
[CAT] because, absent changed circumstances, if an individual has
59

Id. at 661.
Id. at 661.
61
Id. at 661.
62
Id. at 660-61.
63
Id. at 661.
64
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).
60
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been tortured and has escaped to another country, it is likely that she
will be tortured again if returned to the site of her prior suffering.65

The Ninth Circuit held that IJ’s factual determinations in accordance
with the factors above and based on the record, “compels the conclusion
that Soto-Soto ‘met her burden of proof to establish that it is more likely
than not that she will suffer torture if removed to her native country.”66
Therefore, under the clear error standard, the IJ did not err in granting
Soto-Soto relief for deferral of removal under CAT.67
III. IMPLICATIONS
As Judge Wallace raised in the dissent, the majority in Soto-Soto
deviated from ordinary practice.68 When the BIA applies the incorrect
standard, the court ordinarily remands the petition to the BIA.69 However, instead of having the case remanded to the BIA for reconsideration,
the majority went further and remanded the petition for the BIA to grant
deferral of removal.70
Judge Wallace did not join the majority opinion because of this
deviation and dissents on two grounds.71 First, although the BIA inappropriately conducted a de novo review, the IJ also erred in granting SotoSoto CAT relief.72 Judge Wallace argues that the IJ conflated the various
Mexican law enforcement actors in Michoacán into one actor and assumed that Soto-Soto would be returned to the same officers who had
tortured her at the Office of Anti-Kidnapping and Extortions in Morelia,
Michoacán despite INTERPOL’s red notice specifying Soto-Soto be returned to Uruapan, Michoacán.73 Judge Wallace also highlights that
Soto-Soto had remained unharmed for eight months in Uruapan, Michoacán, which is sixty-seven miles away from Morelia, Michoacán.74 Second, Judge Wallace dissents on grounds that the court did not reverse and
remand for BIA’s further reconsideration, deviating from ordinary
practice.75
65

Id.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
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Id.
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Judge Wallace did concur in part with the majority’s holding that the
BIA impermissibly applied the de novo review and engaged in reweighing the evidence, instead of providing thorough arguments that demonstrate the IJ’s finding as illogical or impermissible inferences.76
However, Judge Wallace argues that the court should not “interfere with
our usual role as an appellate court to decide factual issues” and remanding to the BIA for reconsideration as is ordinary procedure would “overcome this mistake.”77
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the facts in the record, the Ninth Circuit held that
the BIA applied the wrong standard of review by engaging in de novo
review, rather than clear error.78 The Ninth Circuit also found that the IJ
was not clearly erroneous under the clear error standard because SotoSoto “met her burden of proof to establish that it is more likely than not
that she will suffer torture if removed to her native country.”79 Furthermore, the court stated that IJ is “entitled to broad deference from the
BIA” when fact finding the effect on the likelihood of future torture.80
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the BIA’s order and granted SotoSoto CAT relief.81

76
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